

VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FAIRFAX COUNTY

IVANA J. SICAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case Number: CL-2024-15382

MP REMODELING & CLEANING
SERVICE LLC *et al.*,

Defendant.

INTERIM JUDGMENT ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case requires the Court to determine how to calculate overtime pay alleged to be due under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and to construe as a matter of apparent first impression various provisions of Virginia’s wage payment laws, including the Virginia Minimum Wage Act (“VMWA”), what Plaintiff refers to as the Virginia Wage Payment Act (“VWPA”), and Virginia’s FLSA analog (“VFLSA”).

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On November 24-25, 2025, this matter came before the Court for a bench trial on Plaintiff’s Complaint for alleged violations of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 201 *et seq.*) and the VWPA (Va. Code § 40.1-29 *et seq.*).¹ A threshold question under both statutory schemes was whether Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants. After receiving the evidence presented by the parties, assessing the credibility of the witnesses, and after having considered the law and the arguments of counsel, the Court found by Order dated December 2, 2025, that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant MP Remodeling & Cleaning Service

¹ The Court issued a prior Partial Judgment Order which incorrectly stated that trial was only on November 25, 2025.

LLC (“MP”) and of individual Defendant Yolanda Padilla (“Padilla”) for purposes of the FLSA. The Court further found that Plaintiff was only an employee of MP for purposes of the VWPA. *See Cornell v. Benedict*, 301 Va. 342, 351 (2022).

The Court has now received proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the question of damages and other relief. Following oral argument on January 23, 2026, the Court now finds as follows.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff worked for Defendants from on or about March 11, 2023 to March 6, 2024 (the “Tenure”). Defendants are based in Fairfax County, Virginia.

2. Defendants offered to provide Plaintiff with a company vehicle but Plaintiff decided to use her own car.

3. Plaintiff started each workday at approximately 7:00 a.m.

4. Plaintiff worked with a crew that cleaned multiple homes daily, up to as many as eight.

5. Defendants paid crew members \$150/day for their labor, but because Plaintiff had her own car and was willing to drive other crew members to jobs, she was paid \$170/day.²

6. Defendants did not keep records that tracked Plaintiff’s compensable time as required by the FLSA, the VWPA, and VFLSA. *See* 29 U.S.C. § 206; Va. Code §§ 40.1-29(C) and 40.1-29.2.

7. As shown in the chart attached hereto as Exhibit A, Plaintiff received varying amounts each week that rarely matched the sums due based on the number of days worked in a prior one-week or two-week period. On the whole, however, Plaintiff was regularly paid

² The \$170/day rate was the subject of a stipulation.

amounts that closely aligned with the actual amounts due based on the number of days she worked. Over the 250 days Plaintiff worked for Defendants she would have been owed \$45,900 based on the \$170/day rate and she received exactly \$45,900.

8. Plaintiff shuttled fellow crew members to assignments in Northern Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia. She drove an average of 80 miles per day.

9. Plaintiff ended her workday after dropping off the last crew member, with an average workday end time of 6:00 p.m.³

10. Plaintiff spent an average of 45 minutes per evening at her home washing towels used in her job.⁴

11. Plaintiff worked an average of approximately 11.5 hours per day, as follows:

a. From March 2023 to June 2023: 5 days per week.

b. From June 2023 to January 2024: 6 days per week, except for one week in September 2023 in which she only worked 3 days.

c. From in or about late January 2024 through March 2024: an average of 3.5 days per week.

d. During the weeks inclusive of July 4, Thanksgiving and Christmas in 2023 and 2024, 4 days.

12. Plaintiff spent \$1,572.78 on cleaning supplies during her Tenure that she used for

³ The evidence also showed that Plaintiff acted as a conduit for payment to certain crew members from time-to-time. At oral argument on January 23, 2026 counsel for Plaintiff stated that these payments were not part of her claims and did not matter to her analysis of the case. The Court likewise does not believe Defendants' payments to others has a bearing on Plaintiff's claims.

⁴ This suggests that Plaintiff worked an average of 11 hours and 45 minutes each workday. However, Plaintiff has argued for 11 hours and 30 minutes, which the Court credits, and assumes Plaintiff is discounting for breaks.

the benefit of Defendants. She was not reimbursed.⁵

13. Plaintiff worked for Defendants for 250 days.⁶

14. At all relevant times, the Virginia minimum wage was \$12 (Va. Code § 40.1-28.10(D)).

15. The Plaintiff's days and hours worked, overtime calculations, and minimum wage analysis is set forth on Exhibit A hereto.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Count I: Fair Labor Standards Act (Overtime)

Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges an overtime pay violation under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 *et seq.* Under the FLSA, Plaintiff is entitled to be paid "not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which [s]he is employed" for all hours worked in excess of forty in a work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); *Carrera v. E.M.D. Sales, Inc.*, 75 F.4th 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2023).⁷ A plaintiff prosecuting an overtime claim under the FLSA must prove that she was employed by an employer engaged in interstate commerce, and that she worked longer than forty hours during a work week without receiving compensation for her overtime work at a rate at least one and one-half times her regular rate. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); *Davis v. Food Lion*, 792 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (4th Cir. 1986). The "regular rate" for an employee paid on a daily basis is determined by dividing the total compensation received in

⁵ This number excludes \$28.60 for "Tolls."

⁶ At trial 271 days was discussed but the number of days the Court adopts is taken from Plaintiff's post-trial submission.

⁷ Virginia's overtime pay law follows the FLSA in all respects. *See* Va. Code § 40.1-29.2 ("VFLSA"). Plaintiff has not asserted a claim under the VFLSA but if she did it would be entirely duplicative of the federal claim.

a work week by the total hours actually worked in that week. *See* 29 C.F.R. § 778.112.

In terms of proving the hours worked, the FLSA requires employers to maintain accurate records, and this obligation cannot be delegated to employees. *Micone v. Levering Reg'l Health Care Ctr., L.L.C.*, 132 F.4th 1074, 1081 (8th Cir. 2025); *see also* 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (“Every employer . . . shall make, keep, and preserve such records of the persons employed by him and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment maintained by him.”). If an employer fulfills this obligation, then the employee can meet her burden by securing production of such records. *Micone*, 132 F.4th at 1081. If an employer fails to maintain adequate records, an employee need only present “sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” *Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.*, 328 U.S. 680, 688 (1946), *superseded by statute on other grounds*, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49-52, § 5, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (May 14, 1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). Put another way, if the employer’s records are found to be incomplete or inaccurate, the employee need only produce evidence deemed satisfactory by the trier of fact. If a violation is established, the employee can recover the overtime wage plus liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

The Court has already determined that Plaintiff was employed by Defendants and now finds that she worked more than 40 hours per work week on a regular basis.⁸ That leaves for determination the issues of Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay and her precise hours worked. To determine Plaintiff’s regular rate in a given workweek, the Court began with the parties’ stipulation that Plaintiff was paid \$170/day. It then multiplied this daily rate by the number of days worked, and for this purpose the Court accepted Plaintiff’s evidence of the

⁸ Defendants did not contest whether Defendants conducted their business in interstate commerce. The Court nonetheless finds that they did.

number of days she worked per work week. This yielded a total weekly wage for each work week in question.

The Court then divided each total weekly wage by the number of hours worked that week. In this case, Defendants failed to keep the required records of Plaintiff's compensable time. Under those circumstances, Plaintiff was entitled to, and did, present testimony and other evidence from which the Court could draw its own conclusions. In that effort, Plaintiff did not need to "prove the precise extent of [her] uncompensated work to recover under the FLSA." *Micone*, 132 F.4th at 1081. As noted, the Court adopts Plaintiff's evidence that she worked an average of 11.5 hours a day. The quotient obtained by dividing the weekly wages Plaintiff received by the number of hours she worked in a given work week yielded Plaintiff's regular rate as shown in Exhibit A.⁹

Next, for each work week that Plaintiff worked more than forty hours, the Court subtracted forty hours from the actual hours worked and multiplied the hours over forty by one-half the regular rate in order to determine the amount of overtime compensation due Plaintiff. The Court's calculations are contained in Exhibit A to this opinion. In summary, Plaintiff is owed \$7,657.39 by Defendants for back overtime pay under the FLSA.

Having found that Plaintiff is due overtime pay, "an employer who violates the FLSA's overtime-pay requirement is liable for unpaid wages and, generally, for an equal amount in liquidated damages," plus costs and attorney's fees. *Carrera*, 75 F.4th at 348-49;

⁹ Plaintiff's evidence suggested that she was sometimes paid more, and sometimes paid less, than arguably she was due for any particular work week. The evidence was clear, however, that Plaintiff was paid each week as an hourly employee even though she was only required to be paid twice a month (the FLSA does not, itself, mandate particular pay periods). There is no claim in this case that Plaintiff was not timely paid the basic wages she was due under the VWPA, Va. Code § 40.1-29, and the Court finds that multiplying \$170/day by the number of days worked in a work week is a fair and reasonable method to determine Plaintiff's weekly wages under all the circumstances of the case.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Liquidated damages are the “norm.” *Carrera*, 75 F.4th at 353. However, under 29 U.S.C. § 260 the Court may, “in its sound discretion,” award no liquidated damages if “the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court [that its violation] was in good faith and that [it] had reasonable grounds for believing” that its pay practices complied with the FLSA. *Carrera*, 75 F.4th at 349, 353. This requires the employer to meet both a subjective standard (good faith) and an objective standard (reasonable grounds for the belief). The employer’s burden is a “substantial one.” *Id.* at 353.

Here, no good faith defense was raised in Defendants’ Answer and thus it is waived. Alternatively, on the merits Defendants failed to persuade the Court that their violation was in good faith. To the extent Defendants kept records at all, their efforts fell woefully short of minimum requirements. There was also insufficient evidence that Defendants generally believed they were complying with the FLSA, that they had any basis to believe that they were complying with the FLSA, or that they took any steps at all to understand their obligations. *Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp.*, 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2nd Cir. 1997) (“good faith . . . requires more than ignorance of the prevailing law or uncertainty about its development. It requires that an employer first take active steps to ascertain the dictates of the FLSA and then move to comply with them”). Defendants wholly failed to meet their “substantial” burden. Thus, Plaintiff’s basic damages of \$7,657.39 will be supplemented by an award of \$7,657.39 in liquidated damages. Further, Plaintiff is entitled to recover her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Count II: Virginia Wage Payment Act (Unpaid Wages; Minimum Wage)

Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that under the Virginia Wage Payment Act, which is what she calls Va. Code § 40.1-29 *et seq.*, “employers must pay employees all the

wages they are due, including wages that are promised *and minimum wages and statutory overtime*” (emphasis added). At oral argument on January 23, 2026, counsel for Plaintiff clarified that Plaintiff’s claim in Count II is for “minimum wages” only and that such minimum wages may be recovered under the portion of Va. Code § 40.1-29(A) which states as follows:

Upon termination of employment an employee shall be paid *all wages or salaries due him for work performed prior thereto*; such payment shall be made on or before the date on which he would have been paid for such work had his employment not been terminated. [Emphasis added]

In other words, Plaintiff contends that unpaid minimum wages may be recovered under the statute because they qualify as a portion of “all wages or salaries due” to her. She further contends that to determine what Plaintiff was paid for purposes of the minimum wage analysis, the Court should ignore the \$170/day Plaintiff earned and instead only look at the amount of funds actually received from Defendants during each week of her employment, subtracting amounts Plaintiff had to pay for cleaning supplies and her car in order to arrive at an amount she calls “free and clear wages.”

The Court disagrees across the board. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege a claim under the VMWA and there is no cause of action for a minimum wage violation under Va. Code § 40.1-29. Alternatively, properly viewed it is clear Plaintiff was never paid less than Virginia’s minimum wage.

Virginia has a range of related but independent wage payment laws contained in Title 40.1, Chapter 3 (“Protection of Employees”). The requirement to pay minimum wages is contained in Article 1.1, descriptively titled “Virginia Minimum Wage Act.” Va. Code §§ 40.1-28.8 through 40.1-28.12 are all exclusively devoted to minimum wages, and Va. Code § 40.1-28.12 is expressly titled “Employee’s Remedies.” These remedies are as

follows:

Any employer who violates the minimum wage requirements of this law shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of the unpaid minimum wages, plus interest at eight per centum per annum upon such unpaid wages as may be due the plaintiff, said interest to be awarded from the date or dates said wages were due the employee or employees. The court may, in addition to any judgment awarded to the employee or employees, require defendant to pay reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the employee or employees.

Plaintiff did not invoke the VMWA in her Complaint and she cannot recover on claims she has not alleged.

The statute invoked by Plaintiff, both in her pleadings and at trial, is Va. Code § 40.1-29. This statute is contained in Article 2 and does not even mention "minimum wages." Instead, Va. Code § 40.1-29 defines in detail how employees should be paid their basic wages, addressing time of payment, medium of payment, withholding rules, and forfeiture of wages. It also provides remedies and penalties for violations. In terms of private remedies, the subpart J of the statute states that:

In addition to any civil or criminal penalty provided by this section, and without regard to any exhaustion of alternative administrative remedies provided for in this section, if an employer fails to pay wages to an employee in accordance with this section, the employee may bring an action, individually, jointly, with other aggrieved employees, or on behalf of similarly situated employees as a collective action consistent with the collective action procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction to recover payment of the wages, and the court shall award the wages owed, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, plus prejudgment interest thereon as provided in subsection G, and reasonable attorney fees and costs. If the court finds that the employer knowingly failed to pay wages to an employee in accordance with this section, the court shall award the employee an amount equal to triple the amount of wages due and reasonable attorney fees and costs.

As a simple comparison of remedies shows, the remedy for a violation of Va. Code § 40.1-

29 is quite distinct from the remedy for a violation of the VMWA.¹⁰

Nothing in the text of these statutes suggests that the General Assembly intended for minimum wage violations to be addressed in two consecutive but different provisions of Title 40.1, or that it intended for two inconsistent remedies to be available for minimum wage violations. Concluding to the contrary would make a portion of Virginia's wage laws superfluous and downright chaotic. Thus, the Court holds that Va. Code § 40.29 cannot be invoked as the basis for a minimum wage claim. Plaintiff's attempt to do so, which appears to have been a strategic decision, is rejected.¹¹ In sum, Plaintiff has not invoked the VMWA in her Complaint and therefore it is not available to her as a source of recovery. Count II is therefore dismissed with prejudice.

Alternatively, and even if the Court were to entertain a minimum wage claim,

¹⁰ The same reasoning applies to claims under the VFLSA. Va. Code § 40.1-29.2 provides that:

Any employer that violates the overtime pay requirements of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 *et. seq.*, as amended, and any regulations, guidance, or rules adopted pursuant to the overtime pay provisions of such federal act or any related governing case law shall be liable to the employee for the applicable remedies, damages, or other relief available under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act in an action brought pursuant to the process in subsection J of § 40.1-29.

As noted, this statute basically makes the FLSA part of Virginia law. Employees alleging overtime pay violations must therefore pursue the remedies allowed by the FLSA alone and cannot seek more expansive remedies under Va. Code § 40.1-29(J) though they are entitled to avail themselves to the "process" of the FLSA.

¹¹ At oral argument on January 23, 2026, counsel for Plaintiff stated he could move to amend her Complaint but did not actually do so. Had he done so, the motion would have been denied. The VMWA clearly addresses minimum wage violations but the remedy for violations is "only" the payment of unpaid minimum wages plus interest. The remedies in the VWPA, which the Court finds is applicable only to a failure to pay baseline wages, includes triple damages. Insofar as it appears that Plaintiff made a calculated decision to invoke the VWPA instead of the VMWA, the Court believes that Plaintiff should be held to her decision.

Plaintiff was never paid less than Virginia's minimum wage of \$12.00/hour. As can be seen in Exhibit A, this is evident from the fact that the amounts Plaintiff was paid were always in excess of minimum requirements.

Plaintiff contends that the Court's minimum wage analysis is not complete, however, unless it adjusts her income to arrive at an hourly rate that accounts for what Plaintiff describes as "free and clear" wages. The concept is that Plaintiff drove her own automobile and paid for certain cleaning supplies, and Plaintiff contends that Defendants should have paid for these items. Because they did not, Plaintiff's position is that these sums should be subtracted from her wages before dividing those wages by her hours worked. According to Plaintiff, the resulting figures would show a minimum wage violation.

The concept of "free and clear wages" is rooted in 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 and is applicable only to the FLSA (and therefore to the VFLSA as well). It provides as follows:

Whether in cash or in facilities, 'wages' cannot be considered to have been paid by the employer and received by the employee unless they are paid finally and unconditionally or 'free and clear.' The wage requirements of the Act will not be met where the employee 'kicks-back' directly or indirectly to the employer or to another person for the employer's benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee. This is true whether the 'kick-back' is made in cash or in other than cash. For example, if it is a requirement of the employer that the employee must provide tools of the trade which will be used in or are specifically required for the performance of the employer's particular work, there would be a violation of the Act in any workweek when the cost of such tools purchased by the employee cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid him under the Act

At oral argument, counsel for Plaintiff confirmed that this provision applies in the FLSA context and would only apply to a minimum wage claim as analogous "persuasive authority." The Court declines to adopt a free and clear wage analysis in the absence of a statute or controlling case law requiring it. Yet even assuming for purposes of argument that a free and clear wage analysis is appropriate, it would not change the outcome in this case.

As a threshold matter, the only items that would be subject to the form of clawback espoused by Plaintiff are those that involve “tools of the trade” that were necessary for Plaintiff to perform her work. The Court finds that only cleaning supplies potentially fit this definition. When the cost of those items is removed from Plaintiff’s wages, Plaintiff’s “free and clear” wages still exceeded the Virginia minimum for all weeks in question. *See* Ex. A. The Court declines to undertake the same analysis for car expenses.¹²

In sum, and for all the foregoing reasons, Count II will be dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, judgment shall be entered as follows:

A. On Count I, for Plaintiff and against Defendants, MP Remodeling & Cleaning Service LLC and Yolanda Padilla, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$7,657.39 for overtime pay and an additional amount of \$7,657.39 in liquidated damages, for a total of \$15,314.78. Plaintiff is also awarded her costs and attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined by separate Order.

B. On Count II, for Defendants. Count II is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

C. Counsel for Plaintiff may submit an appropriately supported request for attorney’s fees by February 16, 2026, excluding from her request any attorney’s fees and costs

¹² Plaintiff argues that she was required to use her vehicle in her employer’s service and that a car is a tool of Plaintiff’s trade (housecleaning). Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that the Court should use the standard deduction for mileage allowed by the IRS to commensurately lower her hourly wage rate. Unlike tools and cleaning supplies which Plaintiff had to procure in order to do her job, Plaintiff did not have to drive her car. Defendants employed a number of crew members who did not use their cars, thus showing that using a vehicle is not integral to the work of housekeeping, and Plaintiff did not show that using her car was made a requirement of her employment or that she would have been terminated if she gave up driving. Indeed, there was testimony that Plaintiff was offered a company car, declined it, and received an additional daily stipend as consideration for using her car.

applicable to Count II. Counsel for Defendants may object to said request by filing a brief not to exceed five pages by March 1, 2026 with a copy to the chambers of the undersigned.

D. The finality of this matter is hereby SUSPENDED PURSUANT TO RULE 1:1 until this Court adjudicates the issue of attorney's fees and costs and issues a separate Order containing the Final Judgment herein. The Final Judgment Order to be issued at a later time will set forth the complete relief to be awarded herein and will state that the matter has become final.

January 29, 2026
Fairfax, Virginia



Timothy J. McEvoy, Circuit Court Judge

SIGNATURES OF COUNSEL ARE DISPENSED WITH UNDER RULE 1:13

EXHIBIT A

Week Ending	Days	Hours	Wages	Supplies	Free & Clear Wages	FLSA Rate	Min Wage Rate	OT Hours	OT Premium
3/14/2023	3	34.5	\$510.00		\$510.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	0	\$0.00
3/21/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00		\$850.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	17.5	\$129.35
3/28/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00		\$850.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	17.5	\$129.35
4/4/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$61.47	\$788.53	\$14.78	\$13.71	17.5	\$129.35
4/11/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00		\$850.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	17.5	\$129.35
4/18/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$16.96	\$833.04	\$14.78	\$14.49	17.5	\$129.35
4/25/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$32.45	\$817.55	\$14.78	\$14.22	17.5	\$129.35
5/2/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$18.44	\$831.56	\$14.78	\$14.46	17.5	\$129.35
5/9/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$98.58	\$751.42	\$14.78	\$13.07	17.5	\$129.35
5/16/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$61.04	\$788.96	\$14.78	\$13.72	17.5	\$129.35
5/23/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00		\$850.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	17.5	\$129.35
5/30/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00		\$850.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	17.5	\$129.35
6/6/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00		\$850.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	17.5	\$129.35
6/13/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$72.35	\$777.65	\$14.78	\$13.52	17.5	\$129.35
6/20/2023	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$49.93	\$800.07	\$14.78	\$13.91	17.5	\$129.35
6/27/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$42.22	\$977.78	\$14.78	\$14.17	29	\$214.35
7/4/2023	4	46	\$680.00	\$27.83	\$652.17	\$14.78	\$14.18	6	\$44.35
7/11/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$31.64	\$988.36	\$14.78	\$14.32	29	\$214.35
7/18/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$31.84	\$988.16	\$14.78	\$14.32	29	\$214.35
7/25/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
8/1/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
8/8/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$63.28	\$956.72	\$14.78	\$13.87	29	\$214.35
8/15/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
8/22/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
8/29/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$99.12	\$920.88	\$14.78	\$13.35	29	\$214.35
9/5/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
9/12/2023	3	34.5	\$510.00		\$510.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	0	\$0.00
9/19/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$54.42	\$965.58	\$14.78	\$13.99	29	\$214.35
9/26/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$86.40	\$933.60	\$14.78	\$13.53	29	\$214.35
10/3/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$11.63	\$1,008.37	\$14.78	\$14.61	29	\$214.35
10/10/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$27.64	\$992.36	\$14.78	\$14.38	29	\$214.35
10/17/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
10/24/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$45.32	\$974.68	\$14.78	\$14.13	29	\$214.35
10/31/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$123.21	\$896.79	\$14.78	\$13.00	29	\$214.35
11/7/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
11/14/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$24.35	\$995.65	\$14.78	\$14.43	29	\$214.35
11/21/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$31.43	\$988.57	\$14.78	\$14.33	29	\$214.35
11/28/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$27.30	\$992.70	\$14.78	\$14.39	29	\$214.35
12/5/2023	4	46	\$680.00	\$50.33	\$629.67	\$14.78	\$13.69	6	\$44.35
12/12/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$26.25	\$993.75	\$14.78	\$14.40	29	\$214.35
12/19/2023	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$20.11	\$999.89	\$14.78	\$14.49	29	\$214.35
12/26/2023	4	46	\$680.00	\$31.48	\$648.52	\$14.78	\$14.10	6	\$44.35
1/2/2024	5	57.5	\$850.00	\$36.11	\$813.89	\$14.78	\$14.15	17.5	\$129.35
1/9/2024	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
1/16/2024	6	69	\$1,020.00	\$65.64	\$954.36	\$14.78	\$13.83	29	\$214.35
1/23/2024	6	69	\$1,020.00		\$1,020.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	29	\$214.35
1/30/2024	3.5	40.25	\$595.00		\$595.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	0.25	\$1.85
2/6/2024	3.5	40.25	\$595.00	\$18.29	\$576.71	\$14.78	\$14.33	0.25	\$1.85

2/13/2024	3.5	40.25	\$595.00	\$93.21	\$501.79	\$14.78	\$12.47	0.25	\$1.85
2/20/2024	3.5	40.25	\$595.00	\$92.51	\$502.49	\$14.78	\$12.48	0.25	\$1.85
2/27/2024	3.5	40.25	\$595.00		\$595.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	0.25	\$1.85
3/5/2024	3.5	40.25	\$595.00		\$595.00	\$14.78	\$14.78	0.25	\$1.85

TOTAL	270	3105	\$45,900	\$1,572.78					\$7,657.39
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